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TAKE-OVER BIDS AND THE ONTARIO
SECURITIES ACT OF 1966
ROBERT L. FALBYe
In recent years, take-over bids have become a source of criticism
from the general public, the press, and the financial community. Con-
sequently, commercial transactions whereby legal or effective control
of a company passes to a take-over bidder were carefully scrutinized and
found in need of more adequate regulation and several jurisdictions
placed statutory control over take-over bids. In Ontario, the task of
preparing recommendations for legislative action fell on the Kimber
Committee and their research resulted in the Ontario Securities Act,
1966.1 This statute is significant as the first statute of its kind in
Canada.
Definition
To define a take-over bid for the purposes of securities supervision
is essentially an arbitrary task and has resulted in definitions which
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The Kimber Committee speci-
fically refused to define a take-over bid in terms of attempted acqui-
sition of either legal or effective control.2 They said that such a defini-
tion would not include a substantial number of offers where the object
of the bid is effective, not legal, control. This point may vary widely
depending on the corporation. 3 The definition recommended by the
Committee defines a take-over bid as an offer to purchase equity
shares which, together with the offeror's presently owned shares, ex-
ceeds twenty per cent of the oustanding equity shares.
This definition appears in the Securities Act, 1966, as section
80(g). Since section 80(f) defines "presently owned shares" as in-
cluding shares beneficially owned, directly or indirectly, by the offeror
or an associate of the offeror, it appears that the definition covers an
extensive area. In addition, section 80(e) includes persons acting in
concert as an "offeror". Hence, it appears virtually impossible for a
bidder to argue that he does not come within the definition and thereby
avoid the Act.
Robert L. Falby, B.A., (University of Toronto) is a member of the 1967
graduating class of Osgoode Hall Law School.
1 The Securities Act, S.O. 1966, c. 142, proclaimed in force May 1, 1967.
2 Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Securities Legislation in
Ontario. (March, 1965), para. 3.11.
3 Id.
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What constitutes a viable definition for the purpose of take-over
bid legislation appears to vary with the philosophy adopted by a par-
ticular jurisdiction. In the United Kingdom a take-over bid is defined
as an offer to buy 51 percent of a corporation's securities made to
more than one holder of those securities. 4 Australian legislation governs
bids offering to purchase shares which exercise not less than one-third
of the voting power at any general meeting.5 These approaches are
similar to that of the Ontario Legislature except for the difference in
percentage control regulated in the offers. The British figure seems
excessive in view of the small number of bids made for the purpose of
acquiring effective control. The one-third figure used in Australia and
our twenty per cent criteria both reflect an arbitrary legislative deci-
sion. Unlike the British definition, the difference between the Australian
and Ontario legislation is one of form rather than philosophical content.
Proposed United States legislation would regulate potential bidders
holding or intending to acquire five per cent of a class of equity securi-
ties.6 This narrow per cent requirement is consistent with the American
approach as seen in the elaborate disclosure requirements of the United
States Securities Acts. While the British regulation of merely bids
for absolute corporate control seems superficial and unrealistic, the
American standards, by contrast, appear excessively rigid and over-
zealous. A more tenable position is that of Ontario and Australia where,
at the same time, take-over bids for effective control are regulated
and the free exchange of lesser quantities of securities is not hampered.
A critic of the Kimber Report in commenting on the then-pro-
posed Ontario definition argued that only bids made with the unequi-
vocal intention of acquiring a controlling interest should fall within
the scope of take-over bid regulation.7 This criticism emphasizes the
difference between a definition framed in wide terms-which may in-
troduce some uncertainty and sometimes include offers which do not
aim or achieve effective control--or whether the statute should define
control in precise terms--which may occasionally exclude an offer
constituting a bid for effective control short of legal control. The
definition contained in the Act appears to be of the latter variety.
While it may be possible for an offeror to acquire control with less
than twenty percent of the equity shares, such circumstances are un-
usual and unlikely to arise. The definition could have been narrowed
to the degree that a public offer to buy one share would constitute a
take-over bid though that sort of extensive control is hardly desirable.
Generally, the Ontario definition is precise enough so that a potential
bidder will be able to ascertain whether or not he must conform to the
regulations; thus, a broader definition for this purpose would be less
desirable. Questions of policy determine the degree of regulation of
take-over bidding and a definition which includes bids for less than
4 Id., para. 3.09.
5 The Security Act (Australia), s. 184.
6 S. 2731, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
7 Address by C. S. Scott, Osgoode Hall, 1965, at the Conference on Com-
pany Law, entitled "Some Aspects of Take-Over Bids".
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twenty per cent of the equity shares was not, by inference, the policy
of the Kimber Committee.
An attempt was made to make the definition in the Ontario Securi-
ties Act more precise by exempting certain kinds of offers. Section
80 (b) exempts private agreements with individual shareholders, offers
to purchase through the stock exchange, offers to private companies
with fewer than fifteen shareholders, and offers exempted by order of
a High Court Judge. The latter three exemptions seem sufficiently
precise. But the first exemption is vague: "A private offer to purchase
by way of private agreement with individual shareholders and not made
to shareholders generally." Is an offer to ninety-five per cent of the
shareholders exempt as not being to "shareholders generally"? If such
an offer were considered to be made to "shareholders generally", would
it be exempted if the bid circular were typewritten separately for each
shareholder instead of being printed? Just what constitutes a "private
agreement" instead of a general offer? Perhaps, like take-over bids
themselves, they are easier to identify than to define. However, for
the sake of consistency, a further definition should be added to the
Act to limit the number of shareholders who could be approached
privately. The definition might read:
"private agreement" means an agreement reached through an offer to less
than five percent of the total number of shareholders holding equity shares
in a corporation.
The Act, including this definition, would still allow an offeror to
acquire control by way of purchase from several persons with large
equity holdings, this sort of acquisition appearing to be the type the
Act exempts. A precise definition of "private agreement" would avoid
the spectacle of an offeror attempting to deal with a large number of
individual shareholders privately in order to fall within the exemption.
It is to be noted that the "offerees" mentioned in section 80 (c)
are defined as a person or company whose last address is shown on
the offeree company's books as Ontario. While this provision may be
significant in a decision relative to the constitutionality of the Act, it
leaves a significant loop-hole in the Act's restrictions. Any bidder who
wishes to avoid being challenged by the Ontario Securities Commission
or avoid conforming with the Act may easily reject all Ontario resi-
dents from his bid. Presently, Canadian companies bidding on shares
note on their offer that it is not applicable to residents of the United
States. There is no reason why Canadian companies could not make
a similar provision with respect to Ontario residents. It is submitted
that the take-over bid requirements of the Act might be more effective
if the "offeror" had been defined as including resident Ontario persons
or companies. By so doing, a bid, originating in Ontario, but applicable
to non-residents of Ontario only, would still be subject to the Act.
Ontario bidders would then find no advantages in a bid to non-resi-
dents, since they would have to comply with the Act in any case.
Alternatively, if this is a real problem, the Act could specifically pro-
hibit Ontario residents from including such a restriction in their take-
over bids.
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The Assumption of Deposit Arrangements
Section 81 contemplates that take-over bids are to be made by
deposit. All of the provisions relating to the time periods are based on
this assumption. Neither the Kimber Report,8 nor the Act itself, states
that all take-over bids must be made by deposit arrangement probably
because it was felt that such a requirement should not be made com-
pulsory. However, the draftsmen of the Act have created a situation
in which, by inference, all take-over bids in Ontario are to be made by
deposit arrangement.
Despite the fact that most bids may be so made, other types of
bids are not so insidous as to be excluded. On the other hand, it may
be argued that while section 81 and its time provisions apply not only
to deposit-type bids, it is only section 81 which does not apply to any
other arrangement. Thus, a bid made with any scheme for share
reception other than deposit arrangement would have to comply with
the Act's provisions relating to bid and directors' circulars and varia-
tion in terms. The definition of a bid contained in the statute does not
limit bids to the deposit-type and it may be that bids which otherwise
fall within the definition are controlled by the Act.
However, it is to be noted that section 81 categorically states that
"The following provisions apply to every take-over bid.. .". So con-
clusive a statement seems to demand that every bid use the deposit-
type arrangement. Section 99 makes it an offence to fail to comply
with section 81 and it will require a brave offeror to attempt a bid
without deposit arrangements, thereby avoiding the provisions of that
section, to get the courts to solve the dilemma. Failure to clarify what
is meant by the deposit scheme appears to be the most serious defect
in Part IX of the Act.
The Time Provisions
Section 82 provides that take-over bids shall be deemed conclusively
to have been dated as of the date of mailing so that the time periods
set out in section 81 begin to run from this date. In the case of a partial
bid for less than all of the equity shares, twenty-one days from this
date are set aside by section 819 as the minimum time in which a
bidder is forbidden to take up and pay for any of the shares. By section
81(5) the maximum date is thirty-five days from the date of the bid.
For the first seven days of the time period, taking up and paying for
the shares is forbidden by section 81(2), the offeree having the right
to withdraw his shares during that time. The Kimber Report 0 recom-
mended this procedure to ensure that shareholders are given adequate
and relevant information and a reasonable time to assess this infor-
mation. It should prevent shareholders from rushing head-long to take
advantage of the offer, allowing at the same time the offeree company
to instruct its shareholders on the company's opinion of the worth of
the bid. This seven-day initial period has thus been provided to give
8 Supra, note 2.
9 Supra, note 1, s. 81(1).
10 Supra, note 2.
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the offeree's Board of Directors notice of a take-over bid, time to assess
the bid, and to advise its shareholders accordingly.
The Licenced Dealers' Rules of the United Kingdom Board of
Trade provide that bid terms must be delivered to the offeree company
three days before the bid to the shareholders. The Jenkins Report did
not recommend modifying this procedure." However, the Kimber Re-
port rejected this approach. It was felt that since a bid is for shares,
which are the personal property of the shareholders, it does not legally
have any effect on the offeree company. Furthermore, prior notification
to the directors of the offeree company gives them the opportunity of
unduly influencing the success of a bid advantageous to the share-
holders.12
It appears that the Securities and Exchange Commission of the
United States (S.E.C.) agrees with this approach. 3 Its chairman, Man-
uel F. Cohen, was faced with a proposal giving the offeree company
twenty days actual notice of a take-over bid.14 He advised that confi-
dential advance filing with the S.E.C. and a seven-day period for share-
holders to withdraw any shares tendered was a superior solution.15 Mr.
Cohen's reasoning for avoiding the twenty-day proposal is substantially
similar to that of the Kimber Committee. A bid for the shares of a
company has no direct bearing on the company itself; legally, the
offer is made to the shareholders, not to the company. 16 With the time
limit set at seven days after the bid, there is sufficient opportunity for
those directors who oppose the acceptance of the bid to do so. This
scheme seems more viable and fairer to all concerned than the British
rules.
While the offer must remain open for both partial bids and one-
hundred per cent bids for the full twenty-one day period, in the case
of a one-hundred per cent bid, shares may be taken up at any time
after deposit. However, shares deposited in response to a partial bid
cannot be taken up before the expiration of the twenty-one day period
because it is impossible to predict what number of shares would be
deposited and, consequently, there is no way of telling how the pro
rata provisions might apply should the number of deposited shares
exceed the number for which the offer was made. The maximum time
in which a one-hundred per cent deposit may be taken up is not stipu-
11 Company Law Committee Report, cmd. No. 1749.
12 Supra, note 2, para. 3.13.
13 Cohen, M. F. "Take-Over Bids" (1966) 22 Business Lawyer, 153.
14 See Senate Bill Number 2731 of the 89th Congress which was introduced
by Senator Williams of New Jersey to amend Section 10 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. The amendment proposed that no take-over bid be made
until twenty days after the bidder had sent to the offeree company notice of
the bid and had filed certain information with the Securities Exchange Com-
mission.
15 Supra, note 11. Mr. Cohen advised the Senate Committee and House
Committee that, instead of twenty days notice, the offering material be filed
with the Securities Exchange Commission confidentially five days in advance
and that the shareholders be allowed seven days after the offer to withdraw
any shares tendered.
16 Supra, note 12.
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lated. This situation may lead to absurdly long periods before the
shares are taken up, particularly when deposited shares may not be
withdrawn by the offeree after the seven-day period under section
81(2).
When the twenty-one day minimum period has expired, the maxi-
mum time for deposits in a partial bid situation is thirty-five days from
the date of initial deposit.17 Unlike one hundred per cent bids, the Act
provides a maximum period in which the shares deposited must be
picked up-within fourteen days from the last date when shares were
deposited. 18 These provisions effectively control bids by deposit arrange-
ment on a partial take-over bid. The time periods ensure that all con-
cerned have ample opportunity to reach a reasoned judgment as to the
merits of a bid. The directors of the offeree company have time to
state their feelings on the offer to their shareholders, and prevent tie-
ups through the acceptance of competing bids. The offeree share-
holders have the opportunity to reach an uninfluenced, objective
decision.
Despite these elaborate restrictions on a partial bid, the draftsmen
of the Act have neglected to stipulate the maximum times for deposit-
ing and for taking up the shares gained on a one-hundred per cent bid.
However, under section 128 of the Canada Corporations Act,19 when
a federal corporation acquires ninety per cent of the shares of another
company within four months of the initial offer, the offeror company
has the power to achieve absolute ownership by court order. Obviously
the four-month limitation period does not apply when a bid garners
less than ninety per cent of the company's shares.
Sufficient control, for some purposes, may be achieved by sixty or
seventy per cent of the shares accepting the bid. Here though, the
minority shareholders may be in a strong enough position to make the
situation uncomfortable for the new owner. This lack of statutory
control may lead to complete failure of the bidder's plans for the offeree
company and is inevitably an inconvenience to the offeree shareholder.
Pro Rata Acceptance
Section 81(7) provides that where a take-over bid is for less than
all the equity shares of a class owned by the offerees and where more
shares are deposited than the offeror is bound or willing to take up,
the shares shall be taken up pro rata, according to the number of shares
17 Supra, note 1, s. 81(5).
18 ,Supra, note 1, s. 81(6).
19 S. 128, Canada Corporations Act, R.S.C., 1952, c. 53, provides that where
a transferor company acquires nine-tenths of the shares of a transferee com-
pany within four months after their initial offer, they may, within the next
two months give notice to a dissenting shareholder that they desire to acquire
his shares. Without a dissent by the shareholder or after disposing of dis.
senting shareholders, the court may then order the shares transferred one
month after the notice. This section puts a maximum date on 100 percent
take-over bids but the periods enumerated are excessive in light of the Securl.
ties Acts' shorter periods on partial bids. In addition, there are no similar
provisions in the Ontario Corporations Act, R.S.O., 1960 c. 71, and thus an
Ontario Corporation lacks even the protection given a Canadian Corporation.
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deposited by each offeree. 20 This provision eliminates the potential un-
fairness and discrimination which can result from offers based onl
first-deposited shares. (The first-come, first-served take-over bid), as
recommended in the Kimber Report.21
The Canadian Bar Association in a brief to the Kimber Committee
argued that a pro rata requirement with a lengthy acceptance period
is only superficially attractive, for;
When a bid is made on a pro rata basis, sophisticated shareholders plan
to delay tender until the last moment In addition, the market approaches
the bid price. A competing bidder or financially strong management can,
under these circumstances, easily move the market above the bid price.
The Association envisaged that the pro rata solution would defeat the
whole concept of adequate information and fairness among shareholders
inter se. They suggested the bidder should be given freedom to deal
with the offeree company as long as he and the management of the
offeree company deal at arm's length, that is, when the bidder believes
there may be a contest and therefore makes no initial approach to the
offeree.
Despite the Bar Association's objections to pro rata acceptance,
it is a fairer approach than that of the first-come, first-served plan.
Over-subscription to a bid (and the predictable market pressures re-
sulting from it) on occasion provides the only instance when the Bar
Association's objections are well-taken and valid. To have but a few
bid situations bar to all of the shareholders of the offeree company an
adequate and fair chance of receiving the bidder's price for their shares,
(a price usually higher than market price) does not appear reasonable
or just.
Variation in Terms of the Offer
Section 83 of the Ontario Securities Act states that, when the
terms of a bid are varied, the offeror must pay the increased considera-
tion to each offeree whose shares are taken up and paid for pursuant
to the bid whether or not they were taken up before the bid was
altered. That is, shareholders depositing shares for a price less than
that finally offered by the bidder, shall receive the full and final in-
flated price. This was a recommendation of the Kimber Committee2
based on the Jenkins Report.23 The section applies to both offers to
purchase shares for cash or in return for other shares whether or not
the bidder has already taken up and paid for the shares. Like the pro
rata acceptance scheme, this is a further attempt to ensure uniform
treatment of every shareholder who accepts the bid.
This section hase been criticized on two grounds.24 First, it will
be difficult to distinguish between a continuing offer involving an up-
20 Supra, note 1.
21 Supra, note 2, para. 3.17.
22 Supra, note 1, para. 3.22.
23 Supra, note 11, para. 294(c).
24 Address by E. C. Milles, Osgoode Hall, 1965 at the Conference on Com-
pany Law entitled "Take-Over Bids, comments concerning recommendations
of the Kimber Committee on the subject of take-over bids.", p. 7.
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ward price amendment and a new offer at a higher price. When has an
offer been amended and when is it a completely new offer? Section
83 (1) appears to cover only an increase in the offered price of a con-
tinuing bid. Thus, an offeror might fail to acquire a desired number of
equity shares in the offeree company, yet take up and pay for all
shares offered to him, and thus completely fulfill his obligations before
closing his bid pursuant to the Act. He then might bid again for the
outstanding shares at a higher price without paying the increase to
the shareholders who accepted the first offer.
Secondly,25 in the case of cash take-over bids for listed shares,
the offeror, by dealing in the exchange, voids section 83's protection
to the shareholder. Here, he would not be committed to pay the higher
price for the shares in the event that the take-over bid price was in-
creased. The argument is somewhat self-defeating for, if control could
be acquired through the stock exchange, there would be no need to
attempt a take-over bid. Furthermore, it is not the implicit policy of
the Act to force all attempts to acquire equity share control into the
"take-over bid" mould.
The section applies to shares "taken up and paid for whether or
not such shares have been taken up by the offeror before the variation
of the take-over bid". Does this mean that shares taken up and not paid
for do not fall within this section? Merely taking up shares does not
necessarily mean that the shares have been paid for. If the shares are
not paid for, then it is the possible interpretation that the increase
in the offered consideration need not be paid.
In recommending that the increase in price ought to be awarded
to persons who took advantage of the initial offer, the Kimber Com-
mittee26 adopted the views of the Jenkins Report.27 But that report
used the words ". .. required to pay the higher price for shares accepted
on the initial as well as the amended offer; and acceptance of the initial
offer should be deemed acceptance of the final offer .. .". By using
"accepted" instead of "taken up", the Jenkins recommendation covers
completed purchases as well as those not yet paid for, since "accepted"
includes those shares both taken up and paid for as well as those shares
only taken up. Have the drafters of the Act defeated their intent in this
section? In order to clarify the section, it should be amended to include
the words "and paid for" so that it would read:
Section 83(l) "... each offeree whose shares are taken up and paid for
pursuant to the takeover bid whether or not such shares have been taken
up and paid for or taken up onZy, by the offeror before the variation of the
take-over bid.
A bid for one-hundred per cent of the equity shares may be con-
verted to a partial bid. Section 83(2) provides that the converted bid
shall be ".... conclusively deemed to be for less than all the equity
25 Id., at 8.
26 Supra, note 2, para. 3.22.
27 Supra, note 11, para. 294(e).
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shares of a class owned by the offerees". Since there is no statutory
restriction on the amendment of terms in take-over bids other than
this section, a problem may arise when an initial one hundred per cent-
bidder takes up shares pursuant to section 81(4) within the latter
fourteen-day period of the twenty-one day restrictive period, before
becoming a partial bidder. Assuming that the change to a partial bid
requires that the bidder conform to the exhaustive time limits set for
partial bids, will he be required to return shares already taken up? To
whom should the share be returned? If the bid is by deposit, then the
party holding the shares may be the proper party. If the bid is not a
deposit situation,28 then must the shares be returned to former share-
holders who assumed they had sold their shares? Return of shares
may defeat the bidder's purpose, since they may eventually be required
to achieve control.
Even if shares taken up and paid for do not have to conform to
section 81 when section 83 (2) applies, it might be asked whether the
newly amended bid is to start the time periods in section 81 running
from the beginning as if it were a new bid. No provision in the Act
answers these questions though section 81 runs from the date of the
bid not from the date of deposit. Possible amendments to the Act should
conclusively state that shares taken up and paid for need not be returned
or in any way be affected by the conversion of terms (other than price).
The passing of title to the bidder will not place former shareholders
in a less advantageous position than shareholders who accept the offer
after the change to a partial bid. The provisions of section 81 should
be expressly stated to apply as soon as the offer is converted, but not
to apply to shares taken up and paid for previously. Hence, if a bid
were converted, for example, fourteen days from the initial offer, no
shares deposited in the next seven days could be taken up and the
thirty-five and forty-nine day provisions would follow as applicable.29
Cash Consideration
(a) Payment
Section 84 provides that where shares deposited are to be paid for
in cash or partly in cash, the offeror shall make adequate arrange-
ments to ensure the required funds are available to pay in full for all
shares the offeror has offered to purchase. This provision should en-
sure that insufficiently financed take-over bids will not be made. The
requirement that the financial arrangements be "adequate" is vague.
However, a more precise definition would be unworkable and it must
be left to a case-by-case determination as to what, in given circum-
stances, is "adequate".
(b) Bid Circular
Section 85(1) requires that a take-over bid circular shall form
part of or accompany a take-over bid and section 85 (2) provides that
it shall contain the information prescribed by Division B of the take-
28 Assuming s. 83 applies to all bids.
29 Supra, note 1, s. 81(6).
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over bid section of the Act. As recommended by the Kimber Report, 30
the Act does not require that the take-over bid circular be received or
fied with the O.S.C. The Committee, in making this recommendation,
considered that, despite the similarity between primary distribution
and share-exchange bids, there should be no review of the latter. Fur-
ther, they said that speed and accuracy were essential to the success
of bids and that the rules should be the same for share-exchange bids
and cash bids. It has been hypothesized that the Kimber report "broadly
hints... that if such circulars were required to be filed with the O.S.C.
prior to their public release, security would be lost.' '31
Whatever their reasons, the Committee concluded that the O.S.C.
ought not to review circulars prior to publication. Thus a wide range
of quality and disclosure is possible which will probably result in a
deterioration of standards.32
A better approach is contemplated in the United States. As an
alternative to the suggestion that a tentative offer be made to the
offeree company twenty days prior to making the offer to shareholders,
the chairman of the S.E.C. has suggested that the offering material
be filed five days in advance with the Commission on a confidential
basis.33 The purpose of this proposal is to provide a legal review of
material without giving a dissident management time to mobilize its
resources and act against the offer, before the offeror could even
solicit shares or support his position.34
Five days pre-examination would give the O.S.C. time to ensure
conformity with Division B. It is questionable, assuming a leak to the
offeree company, whether the company could possibly mobilize resist-
ance in this period. However, even if shorter periods of time could be
utilized by the O.S.C. to examine circulars, the confidential nature of
the information filed must be respected. Leaks to third parties,
who might take advantage of the information to buy the securities
of the offeree company thereby raising the price, can only be pre-
vented by the maintenance of the highest degree of secrecy. If the
O.S.C. is unable to keep such information secret, its general ability
in all areas where confidentiality is requisite is open to question. The
problem goes-more to ensuring that few defects exist in the O.S.C. than
to expecting conformity in circulars without prior perusal.
The Jenkins Report 35 recommends that circulars should be filed
at an unspecified time before issue with the Registrar of Companies.
The Registrar would be empowered to refuse to accept for registra-
tion (subject to judicial appeal) any circular which does not give the
information required by the rules or which does so in a manner likely
to create a false impression. It would be an offence to refuse to register
30 See part VII of Securities Act of Ontario (1966) and the requirements
of filing a preliminary prospectus prior to primary distribution to the public.
31 J. C. Baillie, 8 Canadian Journal of Public Administration, 261 (1966).
32 Id.
33 Supra, note 13.
34 Supra, note 13.
35 Supra, note 11, para. 275.
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circulars. The report does not set a time at which the circular must
be referred to the Registrar. Pre-issue examination of circulars might
be adaptable to the Ontario context.
(c) Contents of the Circular
Information required in the circular includes (1) The number of
securities owned and controlled by the bidder in the offeree company,
(2) The number of offeree company shares traded by the bidder and
his associates for six months prior to the bid (including purchase or
sale price and dates), (3) the particulars of any conditional (take-over
bid) offer depending on a minimum number of shares deposited, (4)
the particulars of time and payment for the offeree shares, (5) a
statement that shares may be withdrawn within seven days after
deposit, (6) details of arrangements to ensure funds are available for
cash consideration bids, (7) a summary showing volume and price range
of shares of the offeree company in the six months preceding the bid
where reasonably ascertainable, (8) particulars of any arrangement
or agreement made or proposed between offeror and offeree company
directors or senior officers, and (9) particulars of any information
known to the offeror that indicate material changes in the financial
prospects of the offeree company since the last published financial
statement.
The degree and specific type of information required is not fully
elaborated by section 90. Only prior examination and approval by the
O.S.C. would positively ensure that adequate adherence to the dis-
closure requirements will exist. Bidders may find that they have dif-
fering views on just how much information must be included.
There is no requirement that principals be disclosed. Section 91
provides that where a bid is made on behalf of an undisclosed principal,
he shall be deemed to be the offeror. The Kimber Committee felt a
disclosure requirement could discourage bids which might otherwise
be made.36 It was considered that though the bidder's identity would
influence the shareholders' decision, the dominant factor is adequacy
of price.37 For this reason the Committee recommended revelation of
terms of cash bid arrangements and of details to ensure funds would
be available on a successful offer.38 Thus, while section 90 (1) requires
disclosure of all the shares owned by the offeror and those under his
control, the circular does not have to state who actually owns the
securities listed. If such securities constitute a substantial block of
stock, the offeree company need only consult its list of shareholders
to identify the bidder provided the block is not held by a nominee of
the offeror.
The Jenkins Report recommends that the Licensed Dealers' gen-
eral rules which require the identity of the bidder to be disclosed, ought
to apply bid circulars. 39 Senator Williams' proposed bill in the
United States also requires the disclosure of the identity of the princi-
36 Supra, note 2, para. 3.18.
37 I&
38 Supra, note 2, para. 3.19.
39 Supra, note 11, para. 280.
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pals, and persons on whose behalf previous purchases have been made.40
The Chairman of the S.E.C. has expressed agreement with this point of
view. Although disclosing the bidder's identity might discourage his
success, the final result would be an offer and a price based on the
opinion of informed investors. 41 The managerial ability and past conduct
of the offeror could be very material to the offeree's decision.42 If a
bidder's past history includes the liquidation of companies with under-
priced shares and dealing with companies in a way inconsistent with
the avowed interest of the offeree shareholder, there is a good argu-
ment in forcing disclosure to allow a shareholder, who otherwise might
sell his shares, to hold out.
The Kimber Committee seems to have taken what might be re-
garded as an immature or cynical view on bidder identity. It is true
that offered price is an important consideration to the offeree, but it is
naive not to expect shareholders to be interested or to care who the
bidder is for reasons other than personal animosity. Identity of the
bidders should have been required. A sound judgment with respect
to the value of a bid cannot be made by the offeree without knowing
who is bidding.
In addition to requiring bidder identity to be revealed, the Williams
Amendment to the United States Securities Exchange Act of 1934
requires that the source of funds to be used in acquisition be disclosed
and if the funds are to be borrowed, the name of the lender.43 Section
90 (6) of the Ontario Act requires that details of arrangements to en-
sure the required funds are available to take up and pay for the shares
must be revealed. There is no necessity enumerated in the Act that
the actual source be disclosed nor that any be noted. Source of funds,
as with bidder's identity, may be essential to the offeree's decision to
sell. If the source were not reputable or in any way not financially
sound, there might be some prospect for the financing to fall through
before the bid is complete. If, for example, an offeror had made ar-
rangements with Atlantic Acceptance Corporation, to finance share
purchases, a shareholder would know the offer was not financially
sound if, just before depositing his shares, the financier collapsed.
Similarly, the source of funds may be tainted with unsound financial
dealings with which a prudent investor may not wish to deal.
Revelation of the source of funds is particularly important where
a Securities Act does not require bidder identity. To know that funds
are available, is an essential disclosure which section 90(6) does not
make sufficiently clear. "Details of arrangements to ensure... funds
are available" does not mean that the source itself is to be revealed. A
simple recitation of terms of financing without mentioning source may
suffice, particularly when pre-perusal of the circular and pre-approval
is not required by the Act. An amendment to section 90 requiring
source-disclosure seems to be in order.
40 The Securities Act (Ont.) (1966) s. 10(c) (1) ().
41 Supra, note 13 at 154.
42 Id.
43 Supra, note 41.
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Section 10(i) (c) (iii) of Senator Williams' Amendment provides
that the purpose of the purchases and the plans of the bidder with
respect to the conduct and continuation of the business of the issuer
shall be included in the bid circular. No equivalent section appears in
the Ontario Act. Such information is relevant since it may be a crucial
point in the decision of an offeree shareholder. Investors require as
much information in arriving at a decision to sell securities as they do
to buy them, says the Chairman of the S.E.C.4 4 and the purpose of the
take-over is one more piece of relevant information that appears perti-
nent to take-over bid circular requirements.
Share Exchange Take-over Bids
Section 85 (3) of the Act provides that bid circulars must contain
the information set out as Division C of Part IX, where the considera-
tion is to be, in whole or in part, securities of a company. Section 94(1)
in Division C provides that such a bid circular shall contain: (1), the
information prescribed by the appropriate form of prospectus that
provides the most significant information on the offeror; (2), the
financial statements of the offeror company; (3), any particulars indi-
cating material change in the financial position or prospects of the
offeror company since the date of the last published financial statement.
As with cash bids, it is the lack of pre-circulation review which
leaves these provisions open to attack. Who is to decide which form of
prospectus provides the most significant information? Only a pre-
circulation review by the Securities Commission can set up a consistent
standard to which bidders may conform. Without it, the problem is
compounded and it may take a long period of time for the courts and
the commission to set up the appropriate standards which, even then,
will be retrospective instead of prospective.
Part VII of the Act deals with trading in the course of primary
distribution to the public. Section 92 (4) provides that Part VII governs
information contained in financial statements included in the circular.
Pro forma balance sheets are not required to be included in the bid
circular. While a pro forma statement may be impossible to prepare
without complete analysis of the offeree company's financial position,
it would not be completely implausable for some sort of predicted
financial position to be required, particularly where the bidder con-
templates merging the offeree company with another company. It may
be that despite an apparent healthy picture presented by the financial
statements required, a merger by acquisition of the two companies may
leave the new company in an untenable position.
Williams' Amendment to the United States 1934 Securities Ex-
change Act specifically exempts from the Act, "any acquisition or offer
to acquire securities made or proposed to be made by means of a
registration statement under the Securties Act of 1933". 45 The Amend-
ment's regulations apply only to cash bids. This may be because the
elaborate registration statement and prospectus filing requirements
44 Supra, note 13.
45 Supra, note 6 at page 5.
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of the 1933 Act have been held applicable to take-over bids which take
the form of share exchange offers.4 6 Under the 1933 Act the registra-
tion statement and the prospectus (actually the greater part of the
registration statement) are required. The former must be filed in ad-
vance of a public offering and the latter distributed to those purchasing
(or exchanging) shares during the period of distribution. The dis-
closures required are thorough, requiring: (1), the offering itself (in-
cluding underwriting and distributing arrangements, underwriting and
selling costs, factors bearing on determination of the offering price,
and the intended use of the proceeds) and, (2), the issuers' business
and property (including its recent history, its controlling and controlled
persons, its management and their compensation and interests, its
material contracts, capital structure and options, the terms of its out-
standing securities, and its financial condition and results of opera-
tions) .47 The financial statements requirements are substantially the
same as required by section 43 of the Ontario Act.
While technicalities of language appear to distinguish the Ontario
provisions from these of the United States, the substantive result of
application of the Securities Act of 1933 and the combined operations
of Division B and C in Ontario, is the same. Both require elaborate dis-
closure pertinent to shareholder acceptance decisions. The sole major
distinction is that the United States required pre-circulation filing
which the Kimber Report declined to recommend 4s and this constitutes
a serious defect in securities protection.
Directors' Circulars
Section 86(1) provides that where the directors of the offeree
company advise acceptance or rejection of a bid made to the offeree,
they shall send out a circular to each offeree containing the informa-
tion required by Division D of Part IX. Section 88 (2) requires that the
circular and delivery of it must be authorized by the offeree company
directors. The information required by Division D is similar in scope to
that required in the bid circular itself. It includes: (1), the number of
securities of the offeree owned by the directors, officers, their as-
sociates, and identity of any person holding more than 10 per cent of
equity shares; (2), a statement as to whether these persons have ac-
cepted or intend to accept the offer; (3), where the offeror is a com-
pany, the number of shares of the offeror owned by these persons; (4),
particulars of any arrangements made between directors and senior
officers with the offeree; (5), whether those in control have any
interest in any material contract to which the offeror is a party and if
so, particulars; (6), a summary showing volume and price of offeree
shares in the preceding six month period where it is not disclosed in the
bid circular or if the directors feel it is not adequately disclosed therein;
(7), any information indicating material change in the financial posi-
tion or prospects of the offeree company since the last published
financial statements; and (8), any other material facts.
46 Supra, note 2, para. 3.85.
47 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1345.
48 ,Supra, note 2, para. 3.24.
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Since, to a large extent, these provisions deal with the problem of
insider trading, the required information could hardly be more ex-
haustive. As with the other sections dealing with circulars there is no
pre-circulation approval required. There is no reason why it should not
be required, particularly if the philosophy of the Kimber Committee
were upset and it was required of the other bid circulars as well. The
seven-day no take-up period might require extension if pre-circulation
approval were required.
A conceivable problem is lack of knowledge of the offeror when,
in a cash bid, he is not disclosed. Assuming the offeree company
directors do not know the bidder's identity, it would be impossible for
them to disclose the relationship between themselves and the anony-
mous bidder. If they did find out his identity and disclosed their hold-
ings then there would be no reason to maintain the veil of secrecy over
the bidder's identity. There is nothing to prevent the offeror company
identifying the bidder to the offeree shareholders. It might be said,
that with an anonymous bid which is, in reality, no secret to the offeree
company directors, it might be their ethical duty to disclose it in the
director's circular even though it is not required.
Section 90, item 2, requires that directors and senior officers who
know the number and designation of offeree equity shares traded in the
six month period preceding the bid, should so disclose, including price
and date of each transaction. Section 95, item 6, requires that total
trading in the six-month period before the bid be disclosed in the
director's circular. There is no requirement that directors and officers
of the offeree company disclose their own trading within this period in
shares of the offeror company. Such a disclosure is essential in any
attempt to prove insider trading and may be pertinent to the recom-
mendations of the directors; particularly where the offeror expects to
show a substantial profit on the transaction. A case could also be made
for requiring disclosure of directors' purchases of offeree shares in the
period since large personal profits may entice them to recommend
acceptance when it is not really in the interest of the offeree company.
With the information before them, offeree shareholders can draw their
own conclusions but without any information they can make no reasoned
decision on the point.
Offences
Section 99 of the Act provides that non-compliance with sections
dealing with the time provisions, variation and conversion of terms, and
cash consideration or failure to send out a bid circular or failure to in-
clude the proper information in the circular, renders an individual
guilty of an offence punishable by a fine of up to $25,000.00 and/or
imprisonment for up to one year. Anyone who acquiesces is also liable
to a $2,000.00 fine and up to one year in prison. Similarly, directors not
sending out a circular or sending one with wrong information are liable
to a $2,000.00 fine. Subsection (4) provides a saving clause if the un-
truth or fact omitted from circulars was not known to the party and
could not have been known in the exercise of reasonable diligence.
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No civil remedy is enumerated in the Act. Shareholders who have
been offended by bidders have no remedy outside the common law.
American courts have held that in some circumstances concealment of
material facts which could significantly affect the seller's evaluation of
the offer may involve a violation of Rule 10 b-5 under the Securities
Act of 1934 which makes such misstatements unlawful. The Kimber
Committee49 noted that in the United States bidders who engage in
deceptive practices may be subjected not only to enforcement action by
the Commission but to civil liability to shareholders who suffer damage
as a result of their acceptance of the offer. Since it appears well set-
tled that, where a statute prescribes a penalty, the law will not imply
one,50 it is unlikely that the Act will give rise to any civil liability.
The philosophy behind the Securities Act is the protection of share-
holders and a section might be added to the Act clarifying and codify-
ing a civil remedy to enforce that approach.
Conclusion
While deficient in some areas, notably the deposit scheme dilemma,
lack of pre-perusal of circulars, and non-disclosure of principal in cash
bids, the regulation of take-over bids provided for in the new Securities
Act is an admirable piece of legislation. Despite Senator Williams'
proposed bill, no such statute yet exists in the United States, which has
the most far-reaching securities laws of any jurisdiction. This may
be due to an American preference for proxy solicitations to acquire
equity control rather than take-over bids. Such a preference is not yet
apparent in Canada.
The American experience seems to have been managerial control
through proxy solicitation. Often poor management leads to depressed
share prices leaving a corporation vulnerable to take-over bids. The
shareholders in such a case may then exert a control over management
which they lacked before. The take-over bid sections of the Act
attempt to refine the shareholders' control in such a situation, putting
the onus on them to determine the fate of the corporation. Such a
philosophy is admirable.
49 Supra, note 2, para. 3.18.
50 See, for example, ORPEx v. ROBERTS, [19251 1 D.L.R. 1101, [19251 S.C.R.
364 TRANSPORT OIL LTD. V. IMPERIAL OIL LTD. AND CITIES SERVICE OIL Co. LTD.
[19351 O.R., 215 DIRECT LUMzER Co. LTD. v. WESTERN PLYWOOD Co. LTD., [19621,
35 D.L.R. (2d), 1. The rule has been stated as: "Where a new obligation not
previously existing is created by statute which at the same time gives a special
remedy for enforcing it, the initial general rule is that the obligation cannot
be enforced in any other manner." (36 Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd ed.,
at 442). A caveat to the rule is that the intent of the statute may not exclude
other remedies. (see Duff, J. in ORP.N v. ROBERTS, [19251 S.C.R. 364 at 370 or
[19251 1 D.L.R. 1101 at 1106 and 36 Halsbury 442). It could be argued that a
civil liability arises from caveat. Shareholders are the class of persons which
the Act intends to protect. In SOLOMONS v. R. GERTBENSTEiN LTD. [19541 2
Q.B. 243 at p. 261 Birkett, L.J. said, ". . . the (statutory) duty imposed.. .was
imposed for the benefit of a particular ascertainable class ... and those persons
have a right of action for a breach of statutory duty, notwithstanding that
penalties are also provided for breaches (of the statute)". The point does not
appear to have ever been successfully argued in Canada. In any case, a statu-
tory right of action would make any litigation unnecessary to decide whether
or not shareholders had a right of action.
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